As discussed over the weekend, the endgame in Venezuela is accelerating and it is now only a matter of time before the Maduro regime exits, stage left, the only question is whether he does so peacefully or with the sound of gunfire in the background. And, as we also noted last week, the collapse of the Maduro regime, will “one way or another, send oil prices up.”
But while a regime change will certainly lead to violent swings in oil prices (mostly higher), even less volatile events could have a significant impact on the price of crude. According to an overnight report by Barclays’ Warren Russell, “even limited new US-imposed sanctions or discussion of broader sanctions could be a catalyst for Venezuela defaulting on its upcoming debt payments, which would put upward pressure on oil prices and help tighten light-heavy spreads.”
As it turns out, the timing of the note was apt because this morning, the Trump administration announced it was imposing sanctions on 13 senior officials of Venezuela’s government, as well as military and state oil company PDVSA, “seeking to ratchet up pressure on President Nicolas Maduro to scrap plans for a controversial new congress.” As Reuters reported, the United States decided to target individuals for alleged human rights abuses and corruption, while sparing the country for now from broader financial or “sectoral” sanctions against its vital oil industry “though such actions are still under consideration.”
The move is aimed at showing Maduro’s socialist government that U.S. President Donald Trump is prepared to make good on his threat of “strong and swift economic actions” if it goes ahead with plans for a vote on Sunday to establish an assembly that critics say will cement Maduro as dictator, the officials said.
So in that gray zone in which Maduro is still in control, but the U.S. sanctions against Venezuela are escalating – as is the case now – what happens to the price of oil? The 15 second answer, according to Barclays, is that it depends on the duration of the disruption. If the sanctions do not lead to a long-term economic disruption, Barclays expects the U.S. to consider Strategic Petroleum Reserve sales as a backstop. “Ample government and commercial stocks are likely to mitigate the severity and duration of any upside price move over a 2-3-month time frame. However, quality differences may become evident as U.S. SPR stocks are mostly 30 API or higher.”
However, “a sharper and longer disruption (eg, exceeding three months) could raise oil prices at least $5-7/b and flatten the curve structure despite an assumed return of some OPEC supply, a more robust US shale response, and weaker demand. It may be just the opportunity OPEC needs to exit its current strategy. US producer hedging activity would pick up if WTI moves to $50-55, limiting price upside potential.”
Among the downstream consequences, is that refining margins should deteriorate if Venezuelan crude oil supply is curtailed. U.S. refiners will be negatively affected by any sanctions related to trade constraints. On the other hand, China and India could benefit if Venezuelan oil is offered at a discount to comparable grades, Barclays suggests.
Finally, looking at Venezuela from a longer-term perspective, this is how Barclays estimates the local investment climate:
It is too early to assess the investment appetite in Venezuela in a post-Maduro environment. Though Venezuela’s assets are large, they are not short-cycle. Companies with deep connections to the country are likely to maintain a presence, but wait for the political landscape to stabilize before making incremental investments. Either way, it looks like Venezuela’s production trend is down over the near term.
For those who are eager for more reasons to buy oil, there are more details in the full Barclays excerpt below:
Looming risk of sanctions against Venezuela
The Trump administration is considering a wide variety of sanctions against the Venezuelan regime, which could range from sanctions on several senior government officials to targeting PDVSA’s ability to transact in U.S. dollars, according to Reuters. This would not be the first time the Trump administration has taken action against Venezuela. The U.S. already imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s vice president (February 2017), eight members of the Supreme Court (May 2017), and other military and government officials. The most recent Supreme Court sanctions were in response to the court’s decision to disband the democratically elected congress. The administration’s recent discussion of potential new sanctions would aim to keep elections “free and fair” and prevent President Maduro from being able to establish a dictatorship, which could occur as early as July 30.
The Trump administration is likely to proceed cautiously and incrementally with any sanctions. In contrast to the energy-related sanctions imposed on Russia and Iran, the more entrenched connections between U.S. companies and consumers and the Venezuelan oil industry lead us to believe that the U.S. administration will take a cautious approach.
Venezuela produces around 2.2 mb/d of oil and NGLs, which represents roughly 2 percent of the global petroleum market. Its Orinoco heavy oil plays a critical role as a feedstock for complex refineries around the world, particularly along the U.S. Gulf Coast. Close to half of its 1.8 mb/d of oil exports go to OECD countries, with Asia consuming most of the remainder. Venezuela is the third largest exporter of oil to the U.S. (?750 kb/d), behind Canada (3.2 mb/d) and Saudi Arabia (1.1 mb/d).
As a guide to potential outcomes, we examine U.S. sanctions on Iran and Russia and their impact on the oil market. We find that the sanctions on Russia have not had a noticeable effect on its production or the oil market, while sanctions against Iran lowered its production and exports and supported oil prices. For more on sanctions on Russia and Iran, see the Appendix of this report.
We see several important differences between the situation in Venezuela and those in Iran and Russia.
1. Unlike Russia and Iran, Venezuela is at significant risk of political and economic collapse. Low oil prices have greatly reduced the government’s ability to pay its outstanding debts while funding imports of basic goods. As a result, President Maduro has taken decisions that have resulted in a deteriorating quality of life for Venezuelans in recent years. Amid the current instability, even limited sanctions are likely to have an outsized effect on the oil market.
2. A collapse in Venezuela could turn it into a regional crisis. More than 1.5mn Venezuelans have already fled the country because of the current crisis, this number could increase exponentially, affecting neighboring countries, particularly Colombia. The international community will need to support the region in a refugee crisis. In the case of Colombia, the situation could have additional implications because there are nearly 2mn Colombian and Colombian descendants living in Venezuela. Those people would likely be the first to cross the border and the Colombian government cannot deny them their rights as Colombian citizens. This could become significant fiscal burden for the Colombian government.
Venezuela needs to import oil and refined products to produce oil. Roughly 50 percent of Venezuelan production is heavy oil, which is typically blended with diluent for transportation purposes. Without access to diluent imports from the U.S. and elsewhere, certain Orinoco projects may be at risk of being shut-in. A trade embargo, sanctions that affect PDVSA, or a sovereign default could be catalysts for heavy oil shut-ins in the Orinoco. We estimated earlier this year that a default could take around 300 kb/d of heavy oil production offline (Commodities special report: The black swans of 2017, January 2017).
3. The current state of Venezuela’s refinery sector necessitates fuel imports, which have been met in part by imports from the U.S. Plagued by underinvestment, Venezuela’s refineries have been running well below nameplate capacity, with Bloomberg recently reporting that the Puerto La Cruz refinery is running at 15 percent utilization. Restricting fuel shipments to Venezuela would result in increased dependency on the PDVSA’s dilapidated plants and imports from other origins to prevent the country coming to a standstill.
4. Venezuela’s oil sector is much more intricately connected to the North American energy system, due to CITGO’s presence in the U.S. and the dependence of other U.S. refineries on Venezuelan feedstock. This interdependency with the U.S. and the lesser connection with other OECD countries, mean Venezuela’s position in the international energy system is quite different to that of Russia or Iran.
If the U.S. does impose further sanctions on Venezuela, it would likely take into account these differences. The use and timing of various sanctions will likely depend on how much the conflict escalates in the coming days and whether other factors (such as the potential for default on sovereign debt payments due in October and November), might be a catalyst for political change in the near future. In our view, if the Trump administration decides to issue sanctions, it would proceed conservatively and become increasingly restrictive only if its goals are not being achieved. One of the stated goals of the Trump administration is for Venezuela to hold “free and fair elections,” according to the White House press statement on July 17, 2017. Before implementing more aggressive sanctions, the administration is likely to seek multilateral support from other nations.
The EU recently expressed a willingness to impose sanctions on Venezuela as well. We believe sanctions could turn out to be a double-edged sword. Multilateral sanctions implemented after having exhausted negotiations are most likely to be successful. Nonetheless, history shows that sanctions alone are not enough to trigger political change, eg, Cuba, North Korea, and Syria. This finally depends on the level of internal pressure, which in Venezuela seems high.
Sanctions against individuals
Additional U.S.-imposed sanctions against government officials may be the next step. Such sanctions are likely to cause some inconvenience but probably would have only a limited impact on Venezuela’s oil industry, in our view.
Sanctions on Venezuela’s energy sector
Sanctions could take several forms, ranging from sanctions similar to those imposed on Russia to more disruptive ones that could completely halt existing operations.
– Sanctions that prohibit or limit investment in new exploration and production activity would not likely have an immediate direct impact on Venezuelan production. Many of the companies with equity stakes in Venezuela’s new greenfield developments are headquartered in non-OECD countries. Furthermore, due to the current upstream investment environment and the increasing political risk within Venezuela, we believe upstream spending on greenfield projects is limited, with many projects shelved for future reconsideration.
– Sanctions prohibiting businesses from operating in Venezuela would be much more disruptive to Venezuela’s current contribution to the oil market. A policy that would limit U.S. producer and service company operations and further investment in Venezuela, would require PDVSA and other international companies to step in to maintain operations. This scenario is likely to exacerbate Venezuela’s declining production profile.
Sanctions against PDVSA
The U.S. could take an even more drastic approach by issuing direct sanctions against PDVSA. In an extreme scenario, if the NOC is banned from banking activity in the U.S. and from trading with U.S. entities, the impact would likely be swift and very damaging to Venezuelan oil production. Directly targeting PDVSA will also likely lead to a sovereign debt default in 2017. This action would affect Venezuela’s petroleum imports and exports.
o PDVSA would have to find new destinations for nearly half of its oil exports, assuming production does not collapse. Currently, Venezuela ships more than 700 kb/d of oil to the U.S. and nearly 100 kb/d to the EU. China and India would likely be alternative destinations for some of this crude.
o PDVSA would also need to find a new source for some of its diluent needs. Algerian and Nigerian crude and condensates were previously used for diluent purposes and could substitute for shipments of U.S. crude and products used in the transport of heavy oil. PDVSA could ask it JV partners to import diluent, but the capacity to do this would depend on the extent of sanctions and other countries’ participation. Even if possible, this could also increase the production cost of these fields to levels that are not financially viable, which could ultimately result in shut-ins.
We believe the U.S. would implement such measures only as a last resort. In addition, the U.S. would likely seek multilateral support from other nations before taking this route. Such an action is likely to be severely disruptive to Venezuela as well as the oil market and its participants.
Sanctions against PDVSA would likely also mean that U.S. producers and service companies conducting business in Venezuela would have to cease operations, which would have an outsized effect on oil production compared to the effect of the U.S.-imposed sanctions on Russia. Compared with Russia, Venezuela is much more reliant on foreign oilfield service companies for oil extraction.
Discussions of broader sanctions likely limits Venezuela’s access to capital
Regardless of whether new sanctions are imposed, discussion of broader sanctions could limit the Venezuelan government’s ability to raise financing and to make debt payments coming due in October and November. Moreover, it could change the government’s willingness to pay. If the current government wants to remain in control and not negotiate, it may be unwilling to use the few assets left to service its debt. As mentioned above, default alone would have a significant impact on oil production and the domestic economy.
The U.S. could sell oil from the SPR to steady the market
We believe the U.S. would consider the sale of oil from the strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) in order to smooth any price volatility that may result from a disruption to supply from Venezuela. The previous US administration was willing to tap the SPR to steady markets after the Libyan supply disruption, and we believe the current administration would consider this option as well. The U.S. did not sell oil from the SPR during the 2002-03 Venezuelan supply disruption and prices rose by more than 40 percent during that period, although other factors also contributed. We doubt a disruption will result in a 40 percent price increase in the event of a supply disruption, but we think prices will rise nonetheless. For this reason, we think the U.S. government would consider using the SPR as a backstop.
At present, we believe the price response to a disruption would be more muted than previous disruptions due to the apparent increased willingness of the U.S. to use its SPR, the fact that OPEC could raise quotas, and U.S. producers would begin to respond to sustained higher prices.