Illustration by Armine Shahbazyan
The first Russo-Turkish war took place in the 16th century. To date, the two empires have faced off on the battlefield 12 times. The rivalry between the Russian and Turkish empires extended to the Caucasus, Crimea and the Balkan Peninsula, highlighting their military-economic interests in the Black Sea basin. Despite alternating successes, Russia was able to oust Turkey from the north and northeast during those wars, and also from the Caucasus. This new series will present the Russo-Turkish wars of the 19th-20th centuries, which were of crucial importance for the two segments—eastern and western—of the Armenian people.
The Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829
In the 19th century, the annexation of Transcaucasia by Russia was often viewed as a separate regional event. In fact, these wars between Persia and Turkey were the military stages of a multi-layered geopolitical process that began in the 18th century and stretched from Eastern Europe to the Caspian Sea. In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was weakening and was gradually being pushed out of the European continent. At the same time, the prestige of the Russian Empire as a possible guarantor of the balance of power in Europe was growing significantly. The national liberation movements that broke out in the European territories of the Turkish Empire were largely successful, bringing independence or autonomy to the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe. These defeats of the Turkish government greatly encouraged the Armenian population, and brought them to also seek liberation from the Turkish yoke.
The victories of the Slavic peoples were greatly facilitated by the support of England, France and Russia, without which, in all probability, it would not have been possible to defeat the Turkish state’s military machine. This growing influence of the superpowers in the liberated countries, in turn, led to great geopolitical competition.
If one analyzes the geopolitical processes of the 18th-19th centuries through a larger prism, a struggle for influence and control in the Black Sea basin becomes apparent. The main player in that struggle was the Russian Empire, which was expanding southwards, especially to secure warm-water ports that could provide year-round access to the open seas.
“Through centuries of effort and sacrifice, Russia has created a state, the likes of which, in terms of its prestige, land mass and global standing, we had not seen since the collapse of the Roman Empire,” shares historian Vasily Klyuchevsky.
The battles between the Ottoman Empire and Russia were for dominance in the Black Sea basin. The Turks were significantly behind their European and Russian counterparts in maritime might. Their merchant fleet and their navy could not be compared to those of Britain or Russia. In those days, a Turkish proverb went: “Allah gave the land to the believer and the sea to the unbeliever.” In order to maintain its influence in the Black Sea basin, Turkey tried to strengthen its position on land, protecting coastal regions from Russian advances.
The 19th-century Russian historian Sergei Solovyov, in his work “The Eastern Question” (1876), notes that Russia was expanding east toward the steppes until the 16th century, when it then turned west to the Black Sea. Russia’s borders totalled 60,000 km, of which more than 38,000 km was coastline. Most of this vast border lies against the northern ice cap and the northern Pacific Ocean, which are not navigable for most of the year. Russia’s advance toward the Black Sea allowed it to sail in all seasons.
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The Napoleonic Wars ended with the Congress of Vienna to conclude the results of the war and define a new world order. The balance of power in Europe, between France, England and Prussia, was set in Vienna, and Russia played a pivotal role. These countries guaranteed the established peace, dividing their spheres of influence. Any significant disturbance to this balance of power would lead to a new great European war.
In 1814-1815, shortly after the defeat of Napoleon and the overthrow of the French Empire, revolutionary movements resurfaced in Europe. “The Western powers only paid attention to the Christian subjects of Turkey when they needed Russia. To get Russia to rise up to fight the Turks, they would then point to their sacred duty to free their fellow believers from a barbaric yoke,” writes Solovyov.
In 1828-1829, the period before another Russo-Turkish war, a very important political event took place in the Balkan Peninsula: the Greek uprising against the Ottoman Empire began in 1821. It was this Greek uprising that introduced the notion of the Eastern Question into European diplomacy, with competition in the Middle East between the superpowers at its heart. The oppressed peoples of the Ottoman Empire were widely and mercilessly exploited in this struggle. Several decades later, the Armenian Question became one of the key elements of the Eastern Question, the internationalization of which at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries had serious consequences for the Armenian people.
The anti-Turkish struggle in the Balkans had already given the Serbs a degree of internal autonomy. Bordering Russia, they had been able to achieve self-rule by Serbian princes. This became an additional impetus for the revolt. At the beginning of the 19th century, the Greeks had created a secret organization called Eteria. Soon thereafter, the Greek movement was led by Alexander Ypsilant, who served in the Russian army and was a cousin of Emperor Alexander I. He tried to stage an anti-Turkish uprising in the Danube region because it was close to Russia; however, he was unsuccessful. Instead, the anti-Turkish struggle broke out in the central regions of Greece and turned into a bloody war.
Emperor Alexander I decided to remain faithful to the Sacred Alliance, according to which European monarchs pledged to fight together against revolutionary movements. The Greek uprising was, at that time, considered a revolutionary movement.
During the Greek uprising in 1821, according to Solovyov, Emperor Alexander I of Russia was in a difficult situation. On the one hand, according to the Sacred Alliance, European monarchs had committed to opposing all revolts and revolutions. On the other hand, in this case, Orthodox Christian Greeks were trying to free themselves of the Muslim yoke. Russia’s aspirations to come to the aid of the Greeks concerned the other European countries. If the Greeks succeeded, then other peoples in the Balkans might attempt to do the same. As most of them adhered to the Orthodox doctrine, this dynamic would significantly increase Russia’s influence in Eastern Europe.
Nicholas I ascended the throne in December 1825, following the death of his brother Alexander I. However, the policy of the Russian Empire toward the Greek uprising did not change significantly. It is true that, on his orders, the number of Russian troops stationed near the Prut River was increased, but the Greeks did not receive direct support. The rebels were mostly aided by Britain, which saw Greece as a potential junction on the way to India. Nevertheless, Turkey was convinced that Russia was in fact supporting the Greeks. In order to increase pressure on their rival, Turkey urged the Persian Shah to start a new war.
The Russo-Persian War of 1826-1827 led to new territorial losses for Persia. Turkey had to sign the Akkerman Convention with Russia, which reaffirmed the clauses of the Treaty of Bucharest, signed following the first Russo-Turkish war of the 19th century. Turkey reaffirmed that the borders of the empire would follow the Danube River, and also acknowledged that Sukhumi, Redutkale, and Anaklia, on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, belonged to Russia. No less important was the economic agreement reached at Akkerman, which allowed Russian merchants to trade freely throughout Turkey. The Akkerman Convention was a diplomatic victory for Russia, and a temporary pause for Turkey. In 1826, the Janissary Revolt broke out in Turkey; it was suppressed with difficulty and bloody clashes by Sultan Mahmud II. Only a year later, at the end of 1827, Mahmud II annulled the Akkerman Convention, which led to a new Russo-Turkish war.
In 1826, the Turkish army inflicted heavy casualties upon the Greeks, whose defeat and retreat were followed by atrocities, including massacres of the civilian population, committed by the Turks. England, Russia and France demanded that the Turks halt the war and resolve the Greek Question through negotiations.
Encouraged by his victories, Mahmud II did not heed the calls of the European superpowers; he would soon be severely punished for it. On October 8, 1827, the joint naval forces of the three countries crushed the Turkish navy near Navarino; 60 out of 90 ships were destroyed, about 6,000 troops were killed. In response, the Sultan declared a holy war and deported the ambassadors of the three countries from Constantinople.
The Russo-Turkish war, which began on April 12, 1828, was inevitable.
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At the start of the war, Russia’s position in the Caucasus was not yet fortified. Parts of Georgia—Megrelia and Kura—were on the Russian side. However, Princess Sophia of Kura was in secret negotiations with the Turks. The appearance of Turkish troops in Sukhumi could further provoke an internal uprising. It is also necessary to note, that although the Russo-Persian War had just ended, if the Russians suffered losses against the Turks, the Persians could attempt to reinstate their lost territories. As military historian Vasily Potto writes, “troops were needed everywhere, only troops.”
Turkey’s position on the Caucasian front was stronger. There were strong fortresses all along the border. Poti, Batumi, Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalak, Kars, Bayazet—these were some of the fortresses against which the Russian troops would battle.
Immediately before the war, by the order of the Sultan, Ghalib Pasha was appointed Governor of Erzurum; he was able to establish order in the region, suppressing the Janissary revolt without casualties. The Turks evacuated the civilian population from the settlements bordering Russia. Knowing that the Armenians were inclined toward the Russians, the Turks disarmed them.
In the early spring of 1828, Russian troops had still not fully returned from Persia, and the Turks were concentrating considerable forces in the direction of Alexandropol (modern-day Gyumri). Both sides were spreading misinformation in order to trick one another and conceal their main goals. The commander of the Russian troops, General Paskevich, spread rumors that they were not preparing for war, and the Turks showed a markedly friendly attitude toward the Russian border guards.
According to the general idea of the war, the primary task of the Russian troops on the Caucasian front was to divert Turkish forces from the Danube—that is, from the Balkan front—to take new territories in Asian Turkey, if possible. To achieve this second goal, the Russians intended to capture the fortresses of Kars, Akhaltsikhe, and on the shores of the gulf, the fortresses of Poti and Anapa. In the Russo-Turkish wars, the Caucasian front often took on a secondary role and, as we will see later, the Russian troops partially renounced their military successes in the Caucasus in exchange for more concessions in the West.
It must be said that the Russian side was not planning a big war on the Caucasian front. The Russians worried that, if they launched hostilities with Turkey, Persian might renounce the Treaty of Turkmenchay and try to reinstate lost territories through military operations in the province of Yerevan. In that case, the Russians would not wage an offensive war; they would move to deep defense. If Persia had not started a war, a number of military units from the Caucasian front would have been transferred to the Balkan front. During the Russo-Turkish war, Persia did not launch an offensive, and General Paskevich was able to dissuade the top leadership from keeping a large part of its troops in the Caucasus.
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In the spring of 1828, the Turks were also preparing for a Russian invasion. A military consultation was convened in Erzurum, where it was decided to concentrate significant forces in Kars. According to the Turkish military plan, in parallel with the attack in the direction of Alexandropol-Yerevan, the Pasha of Akhaltsikhe had to move to Imereti. Then, the armies would attack Tbilisi in two directions. Turkish spies continuously relayed information, but it was not always reliable. For example, they reported that there was a famine in the Russian-dominated regions, and that the commander-in-chief was seriously ill. Paskevich was in fact ill; however, it was just a common cold. At the beginning of June, he was already in Alexandropol.
Contrary to the Turkish central command, the information provided by the Pasha of Kars was more reliable. He knew that the Russians were building a road from Tbilisi to Alexandropol, and that the Russian threat was serious. Emin Pasha of Kars knew that it was necessary to concentrate large forces in the fortress city to prepare for long-term defense. “While Turkish messengers were delivering messages from Erzurum to Kars and from Kars to Erzurum, Russian forces were crossing the border,” writes Potto. The Russians had 15 rear battalions consisting of 8,561 people, 40 field and mountain cannons, as well as 2,767 cavalry and 18 cavalry cannons.
The first military confrontation with Turkey took place on June 19, under the walls of Kars, ending with a Russian victory. The very next day, the Armenians asked Paskevich for permission to return to their villages, which they had been forced to evacuate on Turkish orders. The Russians responded favorably, and 750 Armenian families were allowed to return.
The fortress of Kars had strong defensive fortifications and was surrounded by the gorge of the Kars River and insurmountable rocks. The possible point of attack would be from the south-west, where the towers and defensive lines were located.
On June 20, several Russian detachments attacked and were able to take a few new positions. General Nikolay Muravyov, who was in charge of the operations, reported to Paskevich, “It cannot be said that the Turks are well-fortified but, in all cases, they will fight considerably more persistently than the Persians.”
The Russian side sieged the fortress city and started to prepare its artillery. With the knowledge that the Turks will send assistance, the Russians positioned a couple of detachments on the Erzurum-Kars road. Paskevich intended to start the attack on June 25. He was certain that they would be able to take the fortress and present it as a gift to Emperor Nicholas I on his birthday. To divert the adversary and for strategic purposes, on June 23, the Russian side staged diversionary attacks on the sides of the fortress. However, this escalated into fierce fighting, and the Russian army was forced to attack on all fronts. The Turks retreated soon after; by the end of the day, the Russians gained control of all the towers of the fortress. Paskevich ordered that pardon be granted to all the residents of the fortress, and that their freedom of religion and the inviolability of their property be guaranteed.
A few days after the capture of the city, cases of the plague appeared among the Russian forces. Prior to the invasion, informants had suggested that the plague had been overcome in Kars, but there were cases among the soldiers who had arrived from Erzurum. The plague spread among the army after the capture of the city. Paskevich ordered strict restrictions to be taken. All those infected were isolated, which successfully averted an epidemic.
For a better understanding of the objectives of the Russo-Turkish War, it is important to mention that, at the beginning of June, the Russians also captured the Anapa fortress, further fortifying the Russian presence in the northeast of the Black Sea.
From Kars to Akhaltsikhe
After staying in Kars for about a month, Paskevich decided to move on to Akhaltsikhe. He could have decided to march in the direction of Erzurum, but the Akhaltsikhe Fortress was a constant threat on the Tbilisi-Olti-Erzurum road. Thus, the Russians decided to secure their rear first. The Turks had considerable forces in the region. The 20,000-strong military unit of Kios Pasha, which was rushing to the aid of besieged Kars, had stopped in Ardahan. Kios had missed his opportunity. With the knowledge that the Russian military was moving in his direction, he retreated to Erzurum. Leaving sufficient forces to defend the city, Paskevich led the main army toward Akhaltsikhe.
They approached the Akhaltsikhe Fortress at the end of July. Russian agents started negotiations, offering to spare bloodshed in exchange for surrender. The Turkish side rejected the offer saying, “We are not like the residents of Yerevan or Kars; this is Akhaltsikhe. There are no women here, nor are there any riches. We will die under these walls but will not surrender the fortress.”
Instead of attacking, Paskevich decided to besiege the fortress and force the Turks to surrender under shelling. The Russian artillery took the Turks by surprise. Potto writes that the Turks were determined to heroically defend the fortress, but the destruction from the shelling was formidable and impacted morale. Within a couple of hours, the Russian soldiers were already at the walls of the fortress, and its defenders were in panic and on the run. After capturing the fortress, the Russians noticed that the Turkish cavalry was approaching from Ardahan. This was the battalion sent by Kios Pasha, made up of mainly Lazs, who were supposed to reinforce those defending the fortress. Seeing that the fortress had already been captured, the Turks left. In fact, this was the second occasion when Turkish auxiliary forces arrived a couple of hours too late, with fatal consequences.
On the way to Akhaltsikhe, the Russians also captured the Fortress of Khertvis, which guaranteed uninterrupted communication and prevented the Turkish troops from free passage between Ardahan and Akhaltsikhe.
The population of the Akhaltsikhe region included many Lazs and Ajars, who lived in the mountain gorges and were known for their armed exploits. They excelled at robbery and plunder. The Turkish authorities exempted the Muslims of Akhaltsikhe from taxes on the condition that everyone carry their own weapons and, when necessary, join the Turkish Army. During this period, a large number of Muslim preachers from Anapa, Poti and other regions were inciting anti-Russian sentiment. Russia had been in Transcaucasia for two decades already, but regular uprisings did not allow them to consolidate their positions in the newly conquered areas. The main goal of the 1828-1829 Russo-Turkish War was the takeover of the Turkish settlements on the eastern shores of the Black Sea, which hindered the consolidation of Russian power in the Caucasus.
The capture of the Akhaltsikhe Fortress was a more complicated and challenging military endeavor. The Turkish garrison was large, at about 30,000, and well-armed. The first battles took place in the beginning of August. Soon, Russian auxiliary troops arrived from Georgia, but the Turks maintained a significant advantage in numbers.
A few days after the siege was set, a detachment of 10,000, mainly consisting of Lazs, approached the fortress. The Russians decided to defeat the Laz detachment before dealing with the fortress. In a heavy battle, they managed to inflict heavy losses on Turkish military units. Even Kios Pasha was wounded in the battle. However, the losses by the Russians were also great. On August 10, Paskevich requested the defenders of the fortress to surrender, which they refused.
One of the towers of the Akhaltsikhe Fortress collapsed on the first day of shelling; however, an attack was still risky as the Turkish armed forces were twice the size of the Russians. Paskevich was hopeful that the Christian population of the city would start an uprising. However, the Turks had already accounted for that risk and, on the orders of Kios Pasha, had disarmed the Armenians and Georgians.
The attack on Akhaltsikhe started on August 23 and lasted for two days. Both sides suffered significant losses. The Turkish resistance was fierce. Even Russian historians revered the resistance in their accounts. The Turks remained fortified in the citadel even after all the surrounding fortifications and heights had come under Russian control. Understanding that resistance would prove to be futile, Kios Pasha eventually agreed to put down arms on the condition that they be allowed to leave. The remaining Turkish troops put down their weapons, surrendered the keys to the Russians and left. That is how Akhaltsikhe, which had been under Turkish control for over 200 years, was turned over to the Russians.
The Russians set up a new local government in Akhaltsikhe under the leadership of Armenian General Vasil (Barsegh) Behbutov. To address the needs of the population, which had lost their homes and livelihoods, the new leadership compensated them by distributing money and food and to stabilize the situation in a short period of time. Two days after capturing the Akhaltsikhe fortress, a Russian battalion and two Cossack regiments were sent to capture the Adzkhur Fortress, which was a communication link between Borjomi and Tbilisi.
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While the Russian forces were capturing Akhaltsikhe, the Turkish forces were becoming more active in Kars and Ardahan. The troops of the Pasha of Mush, who had retreated from Akhaltsikhe, moved toward Ardahan. On his way, they deported a large portion of the Armenian population. The Turks saw Armenian support for the Russians and used violence and deportations as a response, something that became frequent. A Russian battalion from Kars moved toward Ardahan to help the Armenians and to clear the area from Turks and Kurds. On August 23, following a similar operation, Russians liberated Armenians from 23 villages and moved them to Kars. It should be said that Armenians were gradually becoming a part of the military operations. About a 70-member Armenian cavalry had been established in Kars. They took part in the military confrontations and sustained 15 casualties. The Russians, who had set up a base in Kars, were able to take Ardahan in August.
Kurds, from the regions which were now under Russian control and neighboring Eastern Armenia, were also active during the war. In the summer of 1828, Kurds from Bayazet started attacking and looting the village of Akhurian and the settlements around the Koghb salt mine. Kurds from Van attacked Khoy and Salmast, where they came face to face with Russian troops. The Russians also planned to capture Bayazet which, located between Erzurum, Kars, Yerevan and Persia, was of strategic importance and a threat to the newly-captured and not yet fully assimilated regions.
Bayazet was under a separate, almost completely independent, feudal Kurdish regime within the borders of the Ottoman state. “It was ruled by a prominent Kurdish dynasty for over 300 years. They did not pay taxes, and their only obligation was to construct fortresses and keep them manned to protect the border region from enemies,” writes Leo.
At the end of August 1828, Russian troops under the command of Prince Alexander Chavchavadze crossed the border and approached Bayazet. After several cannon volleys, the Turks and Kurds left the fortress. Armenians welcomed the Russians at the gates.
In the fall of 1828, most of the Russian Army moved to Georgia for the winter. The Turks prepared for military operations. The Sultan had started to pay greater attention to regions bordering Russia. Leaders who had been defeated by Russia were let go. Haji-Saleh became the governor of Erzurum and was given unlimited powers. The Turks concentrated an army of about 80,000 in Erzurum, not only for its defense, but to recapture Kars. According to the Turkish military plan, the Kurdish detachments also had to move to capture Bayazet. The Russians forces were small in number․ The reinforcement detachment made up mainly of new recruits was late. Paskevich was trying to supplement his troops with whatever he could muster.
The Persian stance here is noteworthy. Only a year had passed since Persia had acceded to the handover of the Yerevan and Nakhichevan provinces to the Russians after its defeat. Still, Persian Shah Abbas-Mirza sent a letter to Paskevich stating that Persia was ready to start military operations against Turkey and attack Baghdad. This would considerably weaken Turkey on the Turkish-Russian military front. Paskevich rejected this favorable offer. Potto writes that Paskevich’s rejection was based on geopolitical calculations, “Persia’s participation in the war could prolong the reconciliation process. Besides defending its own interests, Russia would have to negotiate on behalf of its ally.”
To replenish the army and acquire allies in the war, Paskevich started secret negotiations with the Kurds. He sent Prince Vachnadze to Mush, and the Pasha of Mush allowed him to negotiate with the Kurds. Of course, this cooperation did not come for free; the Russians gave considerable amounts of money and offered positions and titles to the local authorities.
Over the course of the winter preparations, Pashkevich reported to the Emperor and asked for 100,000 rubles to bribe the Kurds.
Collaboration with the Kurds was not reliable, however. Thus, in parallel, the Russians set up a militia in collaboration with more trustworthy nations, including Armenians.
The war resumed in full force in May 1829. The Turks intended to take back Kars and Akhaltsikhe; the Russians intended to also capture Erzurum. It is important to mention that the Russian top military leadership was discussing the possibility of marching toward Trabzon over the winter. Taking Trabzon would extend the Russian presence along the Black Sea basin even further. However, Paskevich succeeded in convincing his superiors that the endeavor would be next to impossible because of impassable mountain ranges. Trabzon was also far from the trade routes and was less economically important. The Emperor agreed with Paskevich, and the Russians moved toward Erzurum.
The Armenian population of Erzurum found itself in an extremely dangerous situation during the siege of the city. The Turks, angered by their favorable outlook toward the enemy (the Russians), were ready to massacre them. The decision of the leader of the Armenian Christians in Erzurum, Archbishop Karapet, obliged Armenians to build fortifications for the Turks and dig trenches. He personally set out to organize the work and saved the day.
After capturing Erzurum, in the autumn, the Russians captured Babert and tried to block the roads to Svaz and Trabzon.
General Paskevich was not only skilled in military affairs; he also had a good grasp of international affairs and his country’s defense system. During the uncertainty of the war, the general would relay to the Russian Foreign Minister Karl Nesselrode about where the future borders of Russia should stand. According to him, Batumi, Poti, Akhaltsikhe and Kars should remain Russian. Bayazet should be autonomous. Nesselrode replied that the wishes of Russia were not the only factor; it was also necessary to take into account the interests of the other European countries. “He [Nesselrode] thought it necessary to encourage the Chirstian population of the new lands that had come under Russian control to migrate to Russia,” writes Leo.
Paskevich was in Babert when he received news that the war had ended and negotiations were underway in Adrianople.
The Treaty of Adrianople was signed on September 14, 1829. The Black Sea coastal regions from the Kuban River to Novorossiysk (Sujuk-kale) were annexed to Russia. Russia was also given Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalak. On the western coast of the Black Sea, the Danube River became the new Russian-Turkish border. Greece was declared an independent state, and obliged to pay 1.5 million piastres a year to the Sultan. The Treaty of Adrianople reaffirmed the autonomy of Serbia, and recognized the autonomy of Wallachia and Moldavia under Russian protection.
The Russians were to return to Turkey a number of fortresses and territories they had conquered in the Caucasus. “The Russian Imperial Court is to return and cede to the Sublime Porte the rest of the Akhaltsikhe Pashalyak, the cities of Kars, Bayazet and Erzurum with their Pashalyaks, as well as all regions occupied by the Russian army that are outside the above-mentioned borders,” states Article 4 of the treaty.
Russia and Turkey granted amnesty to all who took sides during the war. Article 13 of the treaty also states that those who are willing are allowed to move with their belongings and live within the borders of the other state. The following year, in 1830, a mass migration of Armenians from areas that had temporarily come under Russian control but returned to Turkey began. Thousands of Armenians moved from Erzurum, Kars and Bayazet to settle in Akhalkalak, Nor Bayazet and other regions.
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The 1828-1829 Russo-Turkish War affirmed Russian gains in the eastern regions of the Black Sea. The Turks accepted Russian rule in Abkhazia, Guria, Imereti and Poti, which increased the Russian military, political and economic influence in the Black Sea basin. Russian merchants were granted rights to operate through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, giving them access to the Mediterranean.
However, the war did not settle the eastern issue, a highly contested subject between Russia and the European superpowers. Turkey in turn had a difficult time coming to terms with its territorial losses in the Balkans and the Armenian Highland.
While “passions were winding down,” the potential for new wars did not disappear.
 Վահան Նավասարդյան, «Թուրքական ջրուղիները և հայ դատը», Գահիրէ, 1947, էջ 5։ (Vahan Navasardyan, “Turkish Waterways and the Armenian Cause”, Cairo, 1947, page 5.
 Սերգեյ Սոլովյով, «Ալեքսանդր I կայսրը. քաղաքականություն, դիվանագիտություն։ Ս.-Պ.Բ, 1877թ.» (Sergey Solovyov, “Emperor Alexander I: Politics, Diplomacy”, 1877).
 Greek, Filiki Eteria or Society of Friends. A secret organization founded in 1814 in Odessa.
 В. Потто, Кавказская война 1828-1829гг., т. 4, С.-Петербург, 1889, стр. 11. (V. Potto, “The Caucasian War 1828-1829”, vol. 4, St.Petersburg, 1889, p. 11:)
 The Treaty of Turkmenchay was signed on February 10, 1828. As a result of the Russo-Persian war (1827-1828), Persia ceded the Khanates of Yerevan, Nakhichevan and Talish to the Russian Empire.
 В. Потто, Кавказская война 1828-1829гг., т. 4, С.-Петербург, 1889, стр. 28. (V. Potto, “The Caucasian War 1828-1829”, vol. 4, St. Petersburg, 1889, p. 28).
 В. Потто, Кавказская война 1828-1829гг., т. 4, С.-Петербург, 1889, стр. 50. (V. Potto, “The Caucasian War 1828-1829”, vol. 4, St. Petersburg, 1889, p. 50).
 Լեո, հ. 4, էջ 463։ (Leo, Vol 4, p. 463).
 В. Потто, Кавказская война 1828-1829гг., т. 4, С.-Петербург, 1889, стр. 274. (V. Potto, “The Caucasian War 1828-1829”, vol. 4, St. Petersburg, 1889, p. 274).
 Լեո, հ. 4, էջ 479։ (Leo, Vol 4, p. 479).
 Հայաստանը միջազգային դիվանագիտության և սովետական արտաքին քաղաքականության փաստաթղթերում (1828-1923), Երևան, 1972թ., էջ 76։ (Armenia in International Diplomatic and Soviet Foreign Policy Documents (1828-1923), Yerevan, 1972, p. 76).