In mid-2020, Hagia Sophia church, which had been a museum since 1934, was converted into a mosque. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has been in power in Turkey since 2002, announced the mosque’s opening with nationalist, archaic, and harsh rhetoric that described the conversion using terms such as a “right of conquest.” It was a shocking move for non-Muslim and secular components Turkey, as well as a dramatic disappointment for some groups that still hold out hope for Turkey’s AKP, which ostensibly rules Turkey independently, but in reality, is intertwined with various circles of state and societal power.
While the conversion of the Hagia Sophia was the subject of a great debate centred on the topic of world cultural heritage, it is also part of a discussion that extends to the clash of civilisations. However, the gravity of the event and the increasing ethno-religious authoritarianism of the AKP has stymied this debate. Unfortunately, the conversion of the Hagia Sophia for Muslim worship is not the first time that a place of worship with the status of a museum or an active place of worship has been changed into a mosque during the AKP’s rule.
The transformation of Armenian, Syriac, and Orthodox Christian churches, both moribund and those in active use, into mosques that are then placed under the auspices of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has been a common occurrence during the AKP period.
Undoubtedly, this practice is an indication of relevance that Islam has achieved during the AKP’s rule, both as an instrument and as an objective. Additionally, in recent years the head of Diyanet has accompanied President Erdoğan to many official mosque opening ceremonies that are accompanied by prayers, a practice that does not comply with Turkey’s unique understanding of secularism. Moreover, most recently the head of the Diyanet has ascended 21 levels in state protocol, to the 12th position, without legal prevision.
While religion and its official representative, Diyanet, have taken on a powerful and important position in the echelons of the state within the borders of Turkey, foreign political elites outside the country’s borders have begun to approach it with suspicion. For instance, the German branch of Diyanet, which has opened mosques in Germany and has been appointing imams to work there since the late 1970s, was investigated in 2017 based on accusations that it had gathered information about Turkish dissidents and collaborated with Turkish intelligence.
In 2018, the Austrian government attempted to shut down mosques financed by the Turkish government on the grounds they might have connections to radicalism. Most recently, in 2021 French President Emmanuel Macron accused Turkey of intervening in French elections through religious bodies in France that influence the Muslim diaspora, and he indicated that these organisations may be subjected to stricter monitoring. While this is the situation in the West, Turkey is building large mosques and sending imams far and wide, from Tirana to Bishkek and from Mogadishu to Havana, as part of its efforts to become the protector of the Muslim world.
Turkey’s projection of two completely disconnected representations of religion beyond its borders indicates a profoundly paradoxical situation. There are various reasons for this paradox, such as political realities, power relations between countries, and the fact that states have diverse identities. However, it emerges in Turkey in a specific way. While on the one hand religion is used by politics in all areas, it presents itself first and foremost in education, due to the politicisation of religion and the increasingly authoritarian nature of the political administration.
The younger generations in particular have begun to distance themselves from Islam and identify with philosophical currents such as deism, agnosticism, pantheism, and materialism. This development, which demonstrates how state identity and societal identity are diverging, offers clues about the future of Turkey. Undoubtedly, this situation is a paradoxical representation of a transformation, but to understand this, it is necessary to examine the relationship between state and religion and the relationship with society both before and during the AKP era. Such a reading will present us with a broader perspective concerning not only Turkey, but also the Muslim world and the role of religion in politics.
The intricate relationship between religion, politics, and society in Turkey did not begin in the Republican period. Rather, it was a continuation of a longer legacy aligned with global politics. As regards this continuity, one can say that the corners of the religion-politics-society triangle are irrevocably bound up within it in an interest-oriented way.
Following the February 28 post-modern coup period, the political Islamists, who realised that if they came to power through conflict with the state or the global system, they would not be able to remain in power for long, emphasised that they had changed and broke away from their origins. They founded the AKP under the leadership of the former mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Although most of the founding members of the AKP were devout, the party vowed not to mix religion with politics and, furthermore, to act in harmony with Western norms, including the European Union. They stated that their fundamental goals were to end the military and rigid secular tutelage, making Turkey a pluralist country compatible with the global system.
This discourse gained support in liberal and even some left circles, and, after winning the vote of the traditional conservative right in the 2002 elections, the AKP came to power. Up until 2007, the AKP introduced many innovations, first and foremost with regard to the EU, and as the global economic system developed, it succeeded in growing the Turkish economy.
In addition to this, the AKP gained popularity on the world stage by making radical proposals to resolve Turkey’s chronic problems, such as those with Cyprus and Armenia. As suspicions of Islam rose following September 11 terrorist attacks, the AKP seemed to be evidence that Islam and democracy could coexist. However, behind the scenes things were not as healthy and as transparent as they appeared.
While state resources were distributed to AKP supporters and religious communities on the one hand, on the other a devout and conservative middle class began to develop. This led to a situation in Turkey where a government with religious sensibilities distributed resources in a non-patrimonial way, using religion as a vehicle and as a criterion.
The unofficial and unconventional coalition of the AKP-Gülen movement acted in concert until 2012-2013, succeeding, or at least believing at that time it had succeeded, in ousting the Kemalist power blocks from the state ranks. In the same years, 2012-2013, they embarked on a merciless struggle supposedly based on differences of ideology and principle, but in reality, on account of disagreements on how to share the spoils of government. It was this struggle that caused the AKP under the leadership of Erdoğan and the Turkey under his rule to change in an unprecedented way.
Undoubtedly, although various factors, such as the global conjuncture, Erdoğan’s personal characteristics and economic developments played a role, religion was one of the determining factors. While the AKP considered the Gülen movement to be a terrorist group that had infiltrated the state and intended to destroy it, the Gülen movement saw the AKP as an extreme religious, repressive, and corrupt political structure that had broken with the West.
This struggle continued both inside Turkey and in many places in the world until the July 15, 2016 disputed coup attempt. However, on that date, when an attempted coup took place involving the Gülen movement, but which was confusing and the details of the attempt are still ambiguous, it resulted in the marginalisation and partial destruction of the Gülen movement and bestowed on the AKP and Erdoğan a regime that could not be controlled.
From that date onwards the AKP, which changed and transformed itself for three reasons, also began to transform Turkey, resulting in the paradoxical situation that I summarised at the beginning of this piece. The first of these is that Erdoğan and the AKP adopted a more nationalist and pious discourse to secure their voter-base in the face of internal political conflict and economic problems caused by unplanned development.
Secondly, from 2017 onwards, Erdoğan introduced a Turkish-style presidential system, declaring himself to be the only leader and opting to use religious terminology to legitimise this declaration. The final point concerns Islamic communities. As the AKP has brought the Gülen movement, an enormous and influential organisation, to its knees, other Islamist organisations have chosen to toe the AKP line. This in turn has led to these organisations’ influence becoming more apparent in both the public and political spheres and to a change in the identity of the state.
However, all this change does not mean the AKP is ruling a problem-free Turkey. On the contrary, Turkey is grappling with numerous structural problems and is endeavouring to use a religious discourse to overcome them. For instance, during the rule of this government Turkey has become a country where there has been a rise in the number of murders of women and suicides on account of poverty, and where the gulf between rich and poor has widened.
In addition to this, as Turkey plummets down the democracy league tables and corruption grows, the importance attached to religion, when there are so many other issues, is one of the main sources of discontent. The Diyanet budget for 2021 is more than that of seven ministries, and Turkey has more mosques per head of population than any other country in the world. Furthermore, several ministries and bureaucratic institution appear to be under the control of Islamic communities, which has led to Turkey reacting both in the domestic and external spheres in ways that are at odds with the accustomed responses, something which can be linked directly to a change in state identity.
One of the greatest paradoxes of the AKP era concerns religion. A government that says it has pious sensibilities has been responsible for many reprehensible events, and this has led the younger generations, particularly since 2019, to distance themselves from religion and the rise in popularity of Kemalist groups. This is certainly not a situation that can be read as totally pejorative, but it is very difficult to know how such groups would approach the pious sectors of society in the event of regime change. It is also difficult to know how acquiescent the Islamists, who have benefited from all the advantages of being in power since the mid-1990s, starting locally and now nationwide, would be to cede power.
At this juncture, the topic of religion is not just about reading the past or understanding the present day, it remains a significant criterion for designating the future of Turkey. However, it is necessary to underline this final point: for Turkey, religion should not be read as religion, not for yesterday, nor for today, or for tomorrow. The reading of religion only becomes meaningful when it is examined together with politics, power relations and identity.
The views expressed in this column are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of Ahval.
(A version of this article was originally published by the Oasis Center and is reproduced by permission.)
Ahval