Kiev is missing a chance not only to avoid war but also to avoid the loss of its rogue pro-Russian territories
https://asiatimes.com-by Stephen Bryen
Russian troops are camped on the border of Ukraine and tensions are mounting. Photo: Twitter / Fars News Agency
News on February 18 said that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken will meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov late in the week of February 21, “provided there is no further Russian invasion of Ukraine,” according to the US State Department.
Meanwhile, President Joe Biden has spoken by phone with French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and others to discuss Russia’s military build-up.
The escalating military situation around Ukraine and incidents in eastern Ukraine, including a vehicle explosion about 100 meters from the headquarters of the Donetsk Republic, are increasing tension.
According to a Russian report, the head of the Donetsk People’s Republic Militia, Denis Sinenkov, was targeted by the blast that destroyed his car, but he was not hurt.
Western sources said the blast was a provocation by the breakaway Republics who also are evacuating citizens from Donetsk and Luhansk because these people, particularly women, children and the elderly, are in the potential line of fire.
Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin has reiterated, for the umpteenth time, that the only basis for a settlement in eastern Ukraine is for Kiev to negotiate with the breakaway territories based on the Minsk II Protocols (2015).
The Minsk II Protocols were agreed by Kiev, representatives of the breakaway republics, Germany, France and Moscow plus a representative of the OSCE, which was given monitoring responsibilities under the deal to help secure a ceasefire among the parties.
The Minsk II Protocols’ most important provision, beyond the ceasefire – which has been repeatedly violated by both sides since 2015 incurring a significant loss of life and property damage – is that Luhansk and Donetsk would be allowed to become autonomous regions of the Ukrainian Republic, but would function more generally under Ukrainian law and would participate in Ukrainian politics, meaning representation in the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament.
The Protocol foresees that Ukraine would pass enabling legislation after the parties work out the particulars for autonomy.
No US support
Ukraine has generally resisted any action on the autonomy issue, either saying the Minsk deal was no longer relevant to current conditions or demanding that autonomy could only be considered when the republics stood down their militias and the Russians pulled back their military forces.
Washington has also not supported the Minsk II agreement, arguing it was obsolete and irrelevant, a view also echoed by the British, who think a Minsk-based deal would lead to the “Finlandization” of Ukraine.
Behind the scenes, it is quite clear, by omission and commission, that Washington has let the Ukrainians believe that Minsk II is off the table – although the US was never a party to Minsk II.
France and Germany have taken a significantly different approach, working largely whether through the Normandy Group (France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine) or bilaterally with Russia and Ukraine. Both France and Germany have been trying to get the Minsk process back on track, in one way or another.
Kiev’s recalcitrance, largely supported by the US, has made the situation worse than it should be.
Moreover, as the Russians believe through their own assessment that Washington was trying to foment a stronger Ukrainian military, push Ukraine into NATO and increase US forces in Eastern Europe as some sort of counterweight to Moscow, the dialogue between Russia and the US has centered on a set of Russian demands involving Ukraine’s possible NATO membership (Russia calls that a “red line”) and US and other NATO forces in eastern Europe put there after 1997.
As a consequence one can view the current diplomatic channel as diverging on critical issues, so far in fact as to be almost irretrievable. Kiev is also missing a chance not only to avoid war but also to avoid the loss of its rogue pro-Russian territories.
Biden’s position on Ukraine has to do as much with domestic politics as it does with Ukraine’s territorial integrity. On the domestic front, the Biden administration is trying to deflect the image of a weak and irresolute president who failed in Afghanistan and stranded hundreds (if not more) of pro-American Afghans, whose lives were at risk but who were systematically ignored for evacuation.
Being tough on Russia, therefore, is supposed to earn bragging points for Biden and his operatives, such as Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.